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Argentina’s Abandonment of the Rule of Law and Its 
Aftermath  
Andrés A. Gallo 
Lee J. Alston∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
After the impeachment of four out of five Supreme Court justices 
in 19471 and the subsequent new constitution in 1949, Argentina has 
never been able to return to cultivating a belief in a system of checks 
and balances. Beliefs in the legitimacy of the system matter in order 
to prevent short-run opportunistic behavior. The impeachment of the 
Court could be viewed as the culmination of the departure from the 
road toward a true system of checks and balances that was started by 
the coup of 1930 but burrowed into the beliefs of constituents with 
the decade of fraud during the 1930s.2  
The legacy of President Peron is one of political instability, which 
in turn generated sudden changes in economic policies and 
institutions. Successive military and civilian governments appointed 
their own Supreme Court justices in order to accomplish their 
political goals.3 The military government in 1955 removed all the 
 
 ∗ Gallo: Associate Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Coggin College 
of Business University of North Florida, e-mail: agallo@unf.edu.; and Alston: Professor of 
Economics, and Director, Program on Environment and Society, University of Colorado; and 
Research Associate, NBER e-mail: lee.alston@ colorado.edu. Parts of this Article draw heavily 
on Lee J. Alston & Andrés Gallo, Electoral Fraud, The Rise of Peron, and Demise of Checks 
and Balances in Argentina, Sept. 2007, http://colorado.edu/ibs/EB/alston/pubs/Electoral_ 
Fraud_9-6-07.pdf.  
 1. See infra note 153; N. GUILLERMO MOLLINELI, M. VALERIA PALANZA & GISELLA 
SIN, CONGRESO, PRESIDENCIA Y JUSTICIA EN ARGENTINA: MATERIALES PARA SU ESTUDIO 
(1999). 
 2. Lee J. Alston & Andrés A. Gallo, Electoral Fraud, the Rise of Peron and Demise of 
Checks and Balances in Argentina (Sept. 2007) (working paper, on file with author). 
 3. See infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
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justices of the Supreme Court and nullified the Peronist constitutional 
reform of 1949 by a simple Decree.4 In 1958 the new Democratic 
President replaced most of the justices of the Court and introduced 
two new justices; successive governments frequently either forced 
judges to resign or impeached them.5 Though the Supreme Court is 
not held in high regard, each government has believed that the Court 
poses some obstacle to their goals or they would not bother to change 
the composition of the Court.  
In this Article we show how, in the last sixty years, political and 
economic instability in Argentina have been accompanied by judicial 
instability. As a consequence, Argentina lacks adherence to the rule 
of law with deleterious effects on domestic business and foreign 
investment. We contend that in order to reach sustainable growth, 
Argentina has to solve this institutional problem. Otherwise, 
economic growth can surge in the short run but it will be 
unsustainable in the long run. 
JUDICIAL AND ECONOMIC INSTABILITY-MACROECONOMIC 
INDICATORS 
Argentina showed stability in the judiciary, from the 
implementation of the Supreme Court in 1863 to the first 
impeachment of Supreme Court justices in 1946.6 Afterwards, both 
military and civil governments removed Supreme Court justices.7 
Furthermore, the return of democracy in 1983 did not solve the 
problem, as the changes in the Supreme Court continued.8 As we 
show in this Article, the instability in the Supreme Court was closely 
related to political and economic instability, furthering the weakness 
in rule of law, key for investment. In Table I we show the changes in 
the Supreme Court justices before and after Peron’s Presidency. Until 
Peron, no justices had been impeached or “forced” to resign.9 
 
 4. See infra note 153. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Table I, infra. See Appendix A for a detailed administration by administration 
account.  
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Following Peron, only five of the sixty-five changes in justices have 
been due to death or retirement.10 Prior to Peron, governments 
appointed a new justice approximately every two years.11 After 
Peron, governments appointed a new justice every eleven months.12 
An alternative measure of instability is tenure: pre-Peron tenure of 
justices was nearly ten years while in the post-Peron years tenure has 
fallen to approximately six years.13 Oscillations between military and 
democratic governments matched the instability of the Court. 
TABLE I 
Causes of Turnover of Justices in the Supreme Court (1863–2006) 
Years No. of 
Changes 
Death Retirement Resignations Impeachment Removal(1) 
    Involuntary Voluntary   
1863–1945 38 20 12  6   
1946–2006 65 4 1 20 18 4 17 
(1) Removed by military governments. 
The fluctuations in the Supreme Court have been mirrored by 
changes in the executive power.14 After 1946, almost every change in 
government implied changes in Supreme Court composition.15 There 
is an almost perfect correlation between duration of the executive 
power and the Supreme Court justices’ tenure.16 After the re-
installation of democracy in 1983, the duration of the political regime 
increased but changes in the democratic government produced 
changes in the Supreme Court.17 It is interesting to note that the only 
president who tried to govern without changing the Supreme Court 
(De La Rua, 1999–2001) could not finish his term and had to resign 
under strong political pressure.18 This implies that, even though 
politically the country has stayed democratic, checks and balances 
 
 10. See infra note 153. 
 11. MOLLINELI, PALANZA & SIN, supra note 1. 
 12. Id. 
 13. ARTURO PELLET LASTRA, HISTORIA POLITICA DELA CORTE (1930–1990) (2001). 
 14. See Figure I, infra. Own elaboration from Polity IV Project, http://www.cidcm.umd. 
edu/polity/; see also MOLLINELI, PALANZA & SIN, supra note 1. 
 15. MOLLINELI, PALANZA & SIN, supra note 1. 
 16. Id.  
 17. See infra note 153. 
 18. Id. 
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have continued to be unstable, with each president trying to control 
all three branches of government.  
FIGURE I 
The political and institutional instability has been closely related 
to abrupt changes in economic policy and the rules of the game. 
Before the 1940s, abrupt changes in nominal exchange rates followed 
international shocks and the government’s response to those shocks.19 
However, after 1940s, the biggest changes in exchange rates have 
been due to changes in government: the switching back and forth 
between military and civilian leadership.20 The instability of 
exchange rate policy can be also related to the instability on other 
indicators of government policy as shown in Table II. Post-war 
monetary policy became more unstable, with higher rates of inflation, 
which eventually led to hyperinflation.21 As we show in the next 
section, governments were able to implement more aggressive 
 
 19. MARIE-ANGE VÉGAZONÈS & CARLOS WINOGRAD, ARGENTINA IN THE 20TH 
CENTURY: AN ACCOUNT OF LONG-AWAITED GROWTH, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC 
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, PARIS (1997). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Table II, infra. Own calculations based on VÉGANZONÈS & WINOGRAD, supra 
note 19.  
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reforms and sudden changes in policies due to their broad control 
over the judiciary. 
TABLE II 
Policy Indicators: Argentina 1900–2004 
 Inflation M3/GDP (X+M)/GDP
Federal Deficit 
(% GDP) (*) 
Foreign Direct 
Investment  
% GDP (**) 
1900–1905 2.41 0.56 35.29  6.52 
1906–1910 2.66 0.51 48.98 4.19 8.44 
1911–1915 2.00 0.52 46.73 2.21 7.71 
1916–1920 11.70 0.54 39.06 0.67 0.74 
1921–1925 -6.23 0.60 39.00 1.51 1.84 
1926–1930 -0.70 0.60 40.92 2.32 2.24 
1931–1935 -3.86 0.59 30.19 2.94 1.20 
1936–1940 3.01 0.48 27.89 4.34 0.99 
1941–1945 5.55 0.42 15.54 9.77 0.55 
1946–1950 19.86 0.45 18.09 7.05 0.09 
1951–1955 18.14 0.32 12.39 6.02 0.40 
1956–1960 38.25 0.23 12.71 4.97  
1961–1965 23.20 0.16 13.42 5.04  
1966–1970 19.33 0.18 12.60 2.62  
1971–1975 64.43 0.18 12.16 8.56 0.18 
1976–1980 192.89 0.16 16.37 9.04 0.29 
1981–1985 322.63 0.16 17.94 12.14 0.44 
1986–1990 583.80 0.12 18.00 5.58 0.81 
1991–1995 32.23 0.17 20.06 0.64 1.60 
1996–2000 -0.10 0.30 22.98 1.68 4.05 
2001–2004 12.06 0.28 21.80 3.80 0.89 
Notes: (*) Does not include Public Companies 
(**) 1900–1955 Venganzones and Winograd, 1997; 1971–2004 IMF International 
Financial Statistics. 
The confidence of the public in the banking system also declined, 
as shown by the lower trending levels of M3/GDP after 1950.22 The 
 
 22. Id. 
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government ran higher budget deficits, which produced high levels of 
debt and long periods of default.23 Finally, the economy became more 
closed to international trade and the level of foreign investment 
turned almost insignificant in terms of Gross Domestic Product 
(“GDP”).24 One of the most used measures of property rights is the 
“monetary base,” which reflects the confidence of economic agents in 
the rule of law.25 We use a wide measure of monetary base, M3, 
which includes certificates of deposit (“CDs”). CDs are important in 
Argentina, given the different schemes utilized by governments to 
solve banking problems.26 After 1946 there is a very strong 
correlation between the median duration of the Supreme Court 
justices and the monetary base.27 This correlation can be associated 
with problems of property rights enforcement due to the changes in 
the political and judicial systems.28 A similar correlation can be 
observed with respect to the public deficit. A longer tenure of the 
Supreme Court justices is correlated with higher deficits.29 The 
correlation arises because more confidence in the enforcement of 
property rights should increase confidence in the repayment of 
government debt, and encourage further financing.30 However, 
changes in the judicial and political system reduced confidence and 
the government had to reduce the size of deficits.31  
 
 23. VÉGANZONÈS & WINOGRAD, supra note 19. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Leandro Prados de la Escosura & Isabel Sanz-Villarroya, Institutional Instability And 
Growth In Argentina: A Long-Run View (Economics History and Institutions Working Papers 
04-67, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Historia Económica e Instituciones, 2004). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Figure II, infra. Own elaboration based on VÉGANZONÈS & WINOGRAD, supra 
note 19. 
 28. VÉGANZONÈS & WINOGRAD, supra note 19. 
 29. See Figure III, infra. Own elaboration based on VÉGANZONÈS & WINOGRAD, supra 
note 19. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. Own calculation based on VÉGANZONÈS & WINOGRAD, supra note 19. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/8














FIGURE III  
 
 
























































































Supreme Court  T enure
M3 % of GDP








































































































Sup reme Co urt  Jus t ices '  Tenure
Go vernment  Deficit  (%GDP)
Washington University Open Scholarship










160 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 26:153 
 
 
Additional measures of economic performance that correlate with 
the tenure of Supreme Court justices are the openess of the economy 
and the real exchange rate.32 Both the openness of the economy and 
real exchange rates moved suddenly around the years when 
Argentina replaced Supreme Court justices.33 This supports our 





 32. See Figures IV & V, infra. Own elaboration based on VÉGANZONÈS & WINOGRAD, 
supra note 19. 
 33. Id.  


















































































































POLICY CHANGES IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EFFECTIVE  
SUPREME COURT 
When Peron won the election in 1946, he embarked on a 
campaign to solidify his political support and in so doing 
dramatically changed the political and economic institutions within 
which Argentina had prospered.34 At the heart of his economic and 
political plan was an assault on the property rights of landowners in 
the Pampas, one of Argentina’s regions.35 His political support came 
from urban labor in Buenos Aires, rural tenants and labor in the 
Pampas, and small landholders in the smaller provinces outside the 
Pampas.36 Support from the provinces outside of the Pampas was 
critical for Peron because these regions had influential Senators.37 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. EL VOTO PERONISTA: ENSAYOS DE SOCIOLOGÍA ELECTORAL ARGENTINA (Manuel 
Mora y Araujo & Ignacio Llorente eds., 1980). 
 36. Alston & Gallo, Electoral Fraud, supra note 2, at 21. The support of urban labor for 
Peron is well documented and not controversial so we will not discuss it here. 
 37. Id. 




























































































Supreme Court  Just ices' T enure
Real Exchange Rate
Washington University Open Scholarship










162 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 26:153 
 
 
Before Peron, the political representatives from these regions had 
voted with the Conservatives from the Pampas.38 By the end of his 
first term, Peron, through persuasion and coercion, brought the 
various constituents together under the Peronist Party.39  
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE OUTLYING PROVINCES40 
In order to capture the support of the small provinces, Peron relied 
on two institutional changes: the Co-Participation System and the 
Central Bank.41 Ironically, these changes had been introduced by the 
Conservatives during the Great Depression. The Co-Participation 
System authorized the federal government to use the tax base of the 
Provinces in return for a rebated share of the revenue raised.42 This 
gave the central government enormous leverage over the politicians 
in the provinces.43 In addition, Peron used the Central Bank for 
political purposes. Essentially, he would “ask” the Central Bank to 
cover debts of provincial governments.44  
Peron initiated his own changes in governance as well as utilized 
extant institutions. He exercised control over labor through the 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at n.40. Fearing a jail sentence, some recalcitrant members of the Radical Party 
fled to Uruguay. Peron lured the rural Conservatives from the smaller provinces with transfers 
from the federal government as we discuss in the following section. In later elections, Peron 
engaged in extensive redistricting in order to increase the number of Peronists elected. Id. 
 40. For another discussion on how the institutions created or maintained by Peron played 
out in the latter half of the twentieth century, see Spiller, Pablo & Mariano Tommasi, The 
Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with application to 
Argentina, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 281 (2004). 
 41. The Conservative government created the Central Bank in 1935 as an instrument to 
better control the monetary policy during the Depression. On the importance of an independent 
bank in eventually leading to the privatization of provincial banks in the 1990s, see Lee J. 
Alston & Andrés A. Gallo, The Political Economy of Bank Reform in Argentina Under 
Convertibility, 5 J. POL’Y REFORM 1–16 (2002). 
 42. Id. at 4. 
 43. Id. Though the rebates back to the Provinces were not arbitrary, the Co-Participation 
system created a dependency relationship, and the provinces may have feared losing part of 
their rebate if they did not cooperate with the Central government. Id. at 9; see also Spiller & 
Tommasi, supra note 40, at 296 (stating that the relationship between the Central Government 
and the provinces in the second part of the twentieth century was determined by the dependency 
of the provinces on Central Government’s revenue, and the Central Government’s need for 
political support from the Provinces). 
 44. Alston & Gallo, Electoral Fraud, supra note 2, at 21. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/8
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provincial branches of the Secretary of Labor.45 Peron created the 
branches when he was Secretary of Labor during the military 
government and expanded on their use.46 Peron also nationalized 
many utilities, which he used for employment of loyal followers.47  
The use of these diverse instruments permitted the federal 
government to overcome political resistance from provincial 
governments to changes in the economic structure.48 However, the 
use of them also increased the fiscal dependency of the provinces on 
federal government resources.49 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE PAMPAS 
The main political enemy of Peron was the Conservative Party in 
the Pampas.50 The leaders of the Conservative Party consisted of the 
big landowners (estancieros) and their allies, foreign capitalists.51 
The Pampas was the fertile wheat and cattle-producing region and 
accounted for the majority of the country’s exports.52 To work the 
land, the estancieros relied on tenants and sharecroppers.53 Prior to 
Peron, the tenants, sharecroppers, and smallholders voted with the 
Radical Party.54 Peron aimed to help the tenants (and thereby hurt the 
owners) through controlling rents and the prices of output.55 
Legislation helping tenants was not new: the Radicals in the Deputies 
Chambers passed two reforms in the 1920s, though the conservative 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Alston & Gallo, Electoral Fraud, supra note 2, at 21. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.; see also Alan Taylor, Latifundia as Malefactor in Economic Development? Scale, 
Tenancy, and Agriculture on the Pampas, 1880–1914 (NBER Working Paper Series on 
Historical Factors in the Long Run, Working Paper No. 96, 1997) (showing that the system of 
rent and sharecropping worked well).  
 54. Alston & Gallo, Electoral Fraud, supra note 2, at 22. 
 55. Id.; CARLOS F. DIAZ ALEJANDRO, ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE 
ARGENTINE REPUBLIC (1970); MARIO J. LATTUADA, LA POLITICA AGRARIAN PERONISTA 1943–
1983 (Centro Editor de America Latina, Buenos Aires, 1986); ALICIA SANDOVAL, LA 
REVOLUCION DE 1943: POLITICAS Y CONFLICTOS RURALES (1988). 
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dominated Senate reduced the impact of the reforms.56 Peron faced 
no such check on his power. It is important to note that Peron’s 
legislation applied almost exclusively to the Pampas.57 The 
legislation established local boards that controlled rents and 
prohibited evictions.58 The government also controlled the price of 
wheat and cattle by establishing monopoly power over purchases.59 
After purchase, the government sold much of the wheat on the 
international market and used the surplus to finance public 
expenditures, to transfer funds to the smaller provinces in return for 
political support and some subsidies to industry.60 
Legislation of rural rents began with the military government. In 
1943, the government fixed all rents to 1940 prices minus twenty 
percent, and declared all contracts extended until 1945.61 The decree 
contained this provision just for contracts in the Pampas region.62 The 
government renewed the rural rent controls in 1945, and then 
approved it by law in Congress in 1948.63 As result, owners tried 
(partially successfully) to switch to cattle.64 The result was a decline 
in cereal production and a bigger decline in investment in the 
Pampas.65 
Peron designed his policies in the Pampas not merely to punish his 
enemies and help his constituencies, but also to fund the overall 
institutional changes in the economy, such as the nationalization of 
most utilities and many industries.66 With his allies in Congress, 
Peron had little difficulty in passing the legislation that proved so 
 
 56. Alston & Gallo, Electoral Fraud, supra note 2, at 22.  
 57. Id. From 1943 to 1946, the legislation of the Military government was limited to the 
Pampas. The law regulating rents in 1948 applied to the whole country, but it affected primarily 
the Pampas because of the high level of rent and sharecropping contracts. Id. at n.45. 
 58. Id. at 22. 
 59. Id.; Susana Novick, IAPI: auge y decadencia (Centro Editor de América Latina, 
Buenos Aires, 1986). 
 60. Alston & Gallo, Electoral Fraud, supra note 2, at 22.  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.; Atilio Antonio Elizagaray, The Political Economy of a Populist Government: 
Argentina 1943–55 (1985) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis), University of Illinois at Urbana 
Champaign (on file with author). 
 65. Alston & Gallo, Electoral Fraud, supra note 2, at 22; VÉGANZONÈS & WINOGRAD, 
supra note 19.  
 66. Alston & Gallo, Electoral Fraud, supra note 2, at 22. 
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punitive to the Pampas.67 However, the actions taken surely 
represented a legislative “taking” which seems unconstitutional.68 So 
the question is: where was the Supreme Court? 
THE IMPEACHMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT 
Ideally, a Supreme Court would be independent, representing the 
government’s guarantee that the Constitution would be upheld.69 
Although it is questionable whether the Supreme Court was ever truly 
independent in Argentina, the Court did present a potential obstacle 
to Peron’s attack on private property rights.70  
During the military government of 1943–46, the Supreme Court 
was the only standing check to the unfettered will of the executive 
power.71 The radical changes Peron introduced usually clashed with 
the Court, and the opposition relied on the Court as the protector of 
the Constitution and its rights.72 Given the departure of Peron’s 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69.  
The Supreme Court’s major contribution to the development of constitutional law 
arises from three simple propositions. First, all laws, decrees, administrative orders, 
and judicial decisions must obey the Constitution. Second, the judiciary is entrusted 
with guaranteeing the supremacy of the Constitution. So, third, the Court, as the final 
arbiter and custodian of the rights granted under the Constitution, is the place all turn 
to for definitive interpretations and applications of constitutional principles.  
GERMÁN BIDART CAMPOS, THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT: THE COURT OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES (1982). 
 70. Peron attacked not just the Supreme Court, but all sources of opposition to his 
policies. As a consequence, even if his government came to power through a democratic 
electoral process, his policies were far from being democratic, and resembled those of an 
authoritarian regime. EDUARDO CRAWLEY, A HOUSE DIVIDED. ARGENTINA 1880–1980 (1984); 
CARLOS H. WAISMAN, REVERSAL OF DEVELOPMENT IN ARGENTINA. POSTWAR 
COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY POLICIES AND THEIR STRUCTURAL CONSEQUENCES (1987). 
 71. See infra note 153. 
 72.  
The key to the problem is this. Since June 4, 1943 the country does not have a 
legislative branch to discuss the issues pertaining to Congress . . . currently these 
decisions come from the executive, created by the revolutionary movement, without 
any control except for the power of the Judiciary, whose pronouncements cannot be 
immediate because the Court depends on an interested party contesting the 
constitutionality of a Decree or law. 
La Nación (Buenos Aires, Argentina), July 25, 1945. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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policies from the Constitution, from 1943 to 1946, it was normal that 
the Peronist movement reviled the Supreme Court. As Pellet Lastra 
explains: 
If the justices of the conservative Supreme Court would have 
limited their actions to the support of the military coup on June 
7th of 1943 and maintained a neutral position with respect to 
the de facto presidential power, it is very possible that the 
history of the Supreme Court and the judicial system would 
have been very different from what it was. But Repetto and the 
other justices were not resigned to be complacent spectators of 
the maneuvers of the de facto governments . . . they had 
internalized the [R]epublican division of powers and the 
judicial independence, formally and de facto. Their convictions 
were liberal and individualistic, considering that everybody 
occupies their place in a natural and correct way.73 
Furthermore, the Radicals and Socialists ran the presidential 
campaign under the slogan that they wanted to go back to the 
Constitution, that is, to eliminate many of Peron’s reforms.74 As a 
result, public opinion was divided over the role and legitimacy of the 
Supreme Court. The opposition to Peron viewed the Supreme Court 
as the last resort to check unfettered power.75 On the other hand, 
Peron’s supporters saw the Supreme Court as an obstacle to reform.76 
Once Peron won the presidential election, the Supreme Court had to 
be purged in order for reforms to pass the constitutional test and to 
guarantee the support for further reforms. The Peronist coalition was 
formed by urban and rural workers, rural renters, and a branch of the 
Radical party, as well as some conservative parties in the interior of 
the country.77 It is natural that the arguments to impeach the Court 
were based mainly on its resistance to workers’ reforms and its 
support of the rampant fraud in the 1930s.78 These arguments helped 
 
 73. LASTRA, supra note 13, at 108. 
 74. TULIO HALPERIN DONGHI, LA REPÚBLICA IMPOSIBLE (2004). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/8
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bring together workers and their Radical allies to support the 
impeachment.  
Shortly after being elected, Peron made it clear that he viewed the 
Supreme Court as illegitimate: 
In my opinion, I put the spirit of justice above the Judicial 
Power, as this is the principal requirement for the future of the 
Nation. But I understand that justice, besides from being 
independent has to be effective, and it cannot be effective if its 
ideas and concepts are not with the public sentiment. Many 
praise the conservative sentiment of the Justices, believing that 
they defend traditional beliefs. I consider that a dangerous 
mistake, because it can put justice in opposition with the 
popular feeling, and because in the long run it produces a 
rusted organism. Justice, in its doctrines, has to be dynamic 
instead of static. Otherwise respectable popular yearnings are 
frustrated and the social development is delayed, producing 
severe damage to the working classes when these classes, 
which are naturally the less conservative, in the usual sense of 
the word, see the justice procedures closed they have no other 
choice than to put their faith in violence.79 
With this speech the battle line was drawn: Peron embarked on a 
mission to impeach any justices that did not toe the Peronist line. In 
July 1946, the Peronist Congressman Rodolfo Decker proposed the 
impeachment of all but one justice.80 To a large extent, impeaching 
the Court matched the public sentiment of Peron’s constituents who 
believed that the Court was, if not illegitimate, an obstacle to social 
policies.81 Following the impeachment, the Peronists began to craft a 
new Constitution which they submitted for approval in 1949.82 With a 
new Constitution in hand and without a backstop of an independent 
 
 79. Diario de Sesiones del Honorable Senado de la Nacion Constitutido en tribunal, T. VI, 
at 89 (Dec. 5, 1946). 
 80. LASTRA, supra note 13. 
 81. In the U.S., following the election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt (“FDR”) in 
1932, many constituents viewed the decisions of the Supreme Court as an obstacle to achieving 
social and economic progress under FDR’s New Deal proposals. Constituents in Argentina may 
have felt similarly, although the Argentine Supreme Court was never held in as high regard as 
its U.S. counterpart.  
 82. LASTRA, supra note 13. 
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judiciary, the Peronists were able to have their way until the next 
military coup in 1955.83  
THE AFTERMATH OF THE IMPEACHMENT 
After the impeachment process and the new constitution, 
Argentina has never been able to return to cultivating a belief in a 
system of checks and balances. Beliefs in the legitimacy of the 
system matter in order to prevent short-run opportunistic behavior. 
The impeachment of the Court could be viewed as the culmination of 
the departure from the road toward a true system of checks and 
balances.  
The legacy of Peron is one of political instability, which in turn 
generated sudden changes in economic policies and institutions. 
Successive military and civilian governments appointed their own 
Supreme Court justices in order to accomplish their political goals. 
However, without the Court as a backstop, institutional volatility 
ensued. In this section we show some of the policy changes 
implemented by governments that could have been challenged 
constitutionally.84 
BANKING AND MONEY 
Banking is one of the most important economic sectors, given the 
relationship between the banking system and credit to the productive 
sector. The Central Bank was created in 1935 as an autonomous 
institution in charge of establishing monetary policy and regulating 
the banking sector.85 In 1946 the Peronist government ended the 
 
 83. The U.S. confronted a similar turning point in its institutional history, but the 
electorate in 1896 came down on the side of maintaining the independence of the Supreme 
Court. In the election of 1896, the Supreme Court was under assault, but one of its Republican 
defenders presaged the future of Argentina: “There are two places in this country where all men 
are absolutely equal: One is the ballot-box and the other is the Supreme Court. Bryan [the 
Populist candidate] proposes to abolish the Supreme Court and make it the creature of the party 
caucus whenever a new Congress comes in . . . .” Alan Furman Westin, The Supreme Court, the 
Populist Movement and the Campaign of 1896, 15 J. POL. 3, 37 (1953). 
 84. See Table III, supra. Own elaboration based on GRAHAM-YOOLL, infra note 93 and 
De Pablo, infra note 87. 
 85. CARLOS F. DIAZ ALEJANDRO, ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE 
ARGENTINE REPUBLIC (1970). 
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autonomy of the Central Bank, which became a branch of the 
Ministry of Economy.86 Furthermore, the government nationalized 
the banking system by forcing banks to give all deposits to the 
government, which would manage and allocate credit in the 
economy.87 The military government that followed Peron tried to 
rescind these measures by allowing banks to give credit on their own 
and trying to re-instate the independence of the Central Bank.88 
However, because of the extensive use of monetary emission to cover 
fiscal deficits, the government failed to sustain the independence of 
the Central Bank, and relied on it to finance deficits.89  
Without the Central Bank having independence, Argentina 
experienced persistent, high inflation for decades.90 Needing to 
monetize debt, President Illia91 further reduced the little 
independence of the Central Bank. After the intervening military 
government, the new Peron government (1973–75)92 re-nationalized 
banks and granted a tax amnesty.93 The subsequent military 
government (1976–83)94 pursued a financial deregulation that 
produced high speculation and a financial crisis that affected the 
banking system. In this case, the government bailed out the banking 
and financial sectors through public debt and inflation.  
The high inflation in late 1980s also produced high speculation in 
the banking sector, which ended in the freezing of CDs in 1990 
(Menem 1989–1999).95 The Menem government froze the deposits in 
banks and offered government bonds to savers.96 In the 1990s 
Menem’s government tried to restore confidence in the banking 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. JUAN CARLOS DE PABLO, LA ECONOMIA ARGENTINA EN LA SEGUNDA MITAD DEL 
SIGLO XX. L.L. (2005).  
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Table III, supra. Own elaboration based on GRAHAM-YOOLL, supra note 93 and 
De Pablo, supra note 87. 
 92. Id. 
 93. ANDREW GRAHAM-YOOL, TIEMPO DE TRAGEDIAS Y ESPERANZAS. CRONOLOGÍA 
HISTÓRICA 1955–2005 (2006). 
 94. See Table III, supra. Own elaboration based on GRAHAM-YOOLL, supra note 93 and 
De Pablo, supra note 87. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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system by re-enacting the independence of the Central Bank and 
privatizing most of the national and provincial banks.97 It also 
allowed foreign banks to participate in the market.98 The crisis of late 
2001, however, forced De La Rua to freeze all bank deposits, as well 
as term, checking, and savings accounts.99 Duhalde’s government 
extended the freeze in early 2002 and confiscated all deposits.100  
Many banks went bankrupt and the government offered account 
holders government bonds or pesos in exchange for their accounts 
denominated in dollars. The Supreme Court threatened to declare 
unconstitutional the freezing of deposits.101 The threat by the Court 
led to the purging of the Court by Duhalde, completed by Kirchner.102 
Once the Court was purged, its new members declared that the freeze 
on deposits was constitutional and proceeded to find a way to 
restitute money to account holders. The monetary experience of 
Argentina in the last decades shows a lack of secure property rights 
and legislation to protect people’s savings from inflation and 
government takings. 
FISCAL SITUATION AND DEBT 
The structural changes introduced by the Peronist government in 
1946–55,103 provided more sources of revenue but also generated 
higher expenses, and increased the scope and intervention of the 
national government in the economy.104 The government resorted to 
several sources of revenue to maintain a system of subsidies and 
intervention: increased taxes, monetary emission, revenue from state 
companies, the coparticipation law, and export taxes.105 As a result of 
Peron’s spending, deficits mounted and Argentina could not borrow 
 
 97. Alston & Gallo, The Political Economy of Bank Reform, supra note 41. 
 98. See Table III, supra. Own elaboration based on GRAHAM-YOOLL, supra note 93 and 
De Pablo, supra note 87. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. De Pablo, supra note 87. 
 105. DIAZ ALEJANDRO, supra note 85. 
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in the international market.106 After the Peronist government was 
ousted, the military regime tried to undo some of the confiscatory and 
redistributive policies, but the high number of public employees, and 
the strength of public unions, did not allow a rationalization of the 
state bureaucracy and the scope of intervention. Argentina became 
part of the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) in 1955, which 
allowed the country to resort once again to external financing.107 
However this proved difficult in future years when debt repayments 
became problematic.108  
The fiscal relationship between the national and provincial 
governments also oscillated following Peron who first intervened in 
the coparticipation law. In the late 1960s the military government 
changed the coparticipation law by decree, drastically reducing the 
percentage going to the provinces.109 According to the Constitution, 
this can only be done through a special agreement among the 
provinces.110 As a result, the situation in the provinces worsened, and 
the government created the Fonds de Aportes del Tesero National a 
las Provincias (the Fund for Contributions from the National 
Treasury to the Provinces, which we will refer to as the “ATN”), for 
discretional transfers from the national government to the provinces, 
apart from the coparticipation funds.111 This institutional change was 
quickly adopted by subsequent governments, becoming one of the 
most important instruments used by executive power to recompense 
or punish provincial governments.112 Nonetheless, the 
constitutionality of that institutional change was never challenged in 
court, and successive governments used it as an accepted policy 
instrument.113 
The availability of foreign financing in the 1970s generated high 
private and state debt.114 Due to the crisis in the early 1980s the 
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military government nationalized the private foreign debt, creating an 
unbearable weight for public accounts and forcing the country to 
default.115 This default lasted until 1990, when Argentina became part 
of the reorganization of Latin American debt known as the Brady 
Plan.116 However, new debt in the late 1990s produced a new default 
in 2002.117 In this case, the government forced bondholders to accept 
a cut of seventy-five percent of the nominal value of the debt.118 The 
default also affected private pension plans, which had to accept cuts 
close to one-third of the nominal value.119 This debt reduction 
represented the most significant default in sovereign debt in 
Argentine history. As in the case of monetary policy, the 
mismanagement of public debt and the successive defaults have 
undermined the credibility in the institutional foundations of the 
economy. Not surprisingly, the ability of the government to nullify 
contracts and eliminate any judicial resort for private investors 
promotes low investment and credibility. 
PRICES AND LABOR MARKETS 
The period after 1946 witnessed extensive government 
intervention in both prices and the labor market. The first Peronist 
government extended a freeze on rural rents and evictions, which was 
later reversed by the military government in 1955, but re-instated by 
other governments until its elimination in the 1960s.120 Various 
governments also controlled urban rents, as well as other prices of 
mass consumption.121 As a result, government intervention in the 
goods and services markets continued and became the rule, rather 
than the exception, for future governments.122  
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Werner Baer et al., The Achievements and Failures of Argentina’s Neo-Liberal 
Economic Policies, 30 OXFORD DEV. STUD. 63, 63–85 (2002). 
 118. Andrés Gallo et al., The Role of Political Institutions in the Resolution of Economic 
Crises: The Case of Argentina 2001–2005, 34 OXFORD DEV. STUD. 193, 193–217 (2006). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Andrés Gallo, The Political Economy of Argentine Development (2003) (unpublished 
Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) (on file with author). 
 121. Id. 
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Recently, President Kirchner’s government has set the prices for 
numerous public services, most goods in the consumer basket, and 
beef and other exports, as well as established rent controls and the 
suspension of evictions. These actions create considerable uncertainty 
for investors, who cannot count on the government to maintain the 
contractual rules. For example, in the 1990s the contracts of 
privatized companies had a clause establishing that in case of 
devaluation, prices would move according to the price of the U.S. 
dollar or some other stipulated currency.123  
However, when the government faced a crisis in 2002, it set new 
prices and did not allow any adjustment even though many contracts 
were negotiated in U.S. dollars.124 Instead, the government resorted to 
subsidies for companies close to the government to keep services 
running.125 Nonetheless, most privatized companies stopped 
investments in new infrastructure, causing decay in the quality of the 
services offered. 
In the case of the labor market, the first Peronist government 
clearly went against the Constitution when it decided to regulate 
labor conditions. According to the Constitution of 1853, labor 
conditions have to be regulated by the provinces.126 However, the 
military government in 1943 to 1946 enacted regulations by decree, 
establishing national regulations for labor conditions.127 This was one 
of the main issues that led to the impeachment of Supreme Court 
justices in 1946.128 Furthermore, Peron created the Aguinaldo, which 
is an extra month of salary.129 These changes, together with the 
creation of loyal unions, created a highly concentrated, statist system 
of setting salaries, determining wage increases, and regulating the 
labor market.  
As a result, the economy moved to a cooperative system of 
bargaining between unions and firms though there were constitutional 
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underpinnings.130 Furthermore, labor regulations became a highly 
debated issue for every government, and the unions occupied an 
important position of power with respect to the national government 
and the provinces. 
FOREIGN SECTOR AND INDUSTRY 
Beginning with first Peron government and continuing until the 
present, governments have intervened extensively in foreign trade. 
The first Peronist government created IAPI (“Instituto Argentino 
para la Promocion y el Intercambio”), a national agency in charge of 
foreign trade.131 The IAPI set domestic crop and livestock prices and 
sold the products abroad at world prices.132 The government used the 
difference between what they paid farmers and what they received for 
the exports to subsidize a variety of government projects and promote 
industry.133 As a result, there was a disincentive to invest in 
agriculture and other exporting sectors. Even though the military 
government after Peron eliminated the IAPI, successive governments 
resorted to different types of interventions in trade, including: 
exchange-rate controls, tariffs, taxes on exports, the prohibition of 
exporting, and the prohibition of certain imports.134 These kinds of 
policies are a staple of current economic policy, with taxes on exports 
and prohibitions on certain exports, for example, beef, in order to 
keep prices low for consumers.135 
There was an emphasis to develop industry, but with strong state 
intervention through state companies, subsidies through the credit 
market, and subsidies from taxes on exports.136 Nonetheless, there 
were successive changes in the way state companies operated, or the 
extent of foreign participation. For example, Frondizi’s government 
(1958–62) tried to increase oil production by contracting with United 
States companies, but the contracts were later nullified by Illia’s 
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government.137 By the 1980s the government realized that many 
state-owned companies were bankrupt and highly corrupt, and it 
decided to privatize many firms.138 President Menem continued with 
this trend.139 However, the way in which the government privatized, 
and the corruption in the process damaged the reputation of the 
privatization process.140 President Duhalde and President Kirchner’s 
governments have breached these contracts and, in some cases, re-
nationalized the companies.141 
CONSTITUTION AND POLITICS 
The policy oscillations since the first Peron government put the 
Constitution under attack. The Peronist government in 1946 replaced 
the Constitution of 1853 with a new one in 1949.142 The Peronist 
Constitution lasted until 1955, when the new military government 
went back to the pre-Peron Constitution.143 The military government 
proceeded to reform the Constitution in 1957, without allowing the 
Peronist party to participate.144 However, the reforms were not as 
ambitious as the 1949 Constitution. The Constitution was reformed 
again in 1973 and 1994. In the last case, the main purpose of the 
reform was to allow the re-election of President Menem. The 
“reform” was reached through the infamous Pacto de Olivos, where 
Menem and former President Alfonsin agreed on the constitutional 
reform. 
On the political side, the changes in the Supreme Court allowed 
governments to concentrate power and alienate, or eliminate, the 
opposition. The first Peronist government persecuted and 
incarcerated members of the opposition and controlled all three 
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 139. See Table III supra. Own elaboration based on GRAHAM-YOOLL, supra note 93 and 
DE PABLO, supra note 87. 
 140. Roberto Pablo Saba & Luigi Manzetti, Privatization in Argentina: The Implications 
for Corruption, 25 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 353 (1997). 
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branches of power.145 Afterwards, this has been the main goal of all 
governments.146 The military governments in 1955 and 1962 virtually 
prohibited the Peronist party from participating in elections.147 After 
the return to democracy, presidents have used decrees and declared 
the country under “Economic Emergency” in order to obtain 
permission from Congress to govern using decrees instead of laws.148 
Controlling the Supreme Court has played an important role in 
concentrating power in the executive and giving the President the 
flexibility to implement diverse policies. For example, in the 1990s, 
the Court allowed Menem to introduce sweeping reforms and 
privatize most state companies.149 President De La Rua did not 
attempt to change the Supreme Court, and governed with a weak 
Congress and strong opposition in the provinces.150 Such weaknesses 
determined his quick demise. President Duhalde and President 
Kirchner have learned their history lessons and proceeded to control 
the Supreme Court, which quickly supported the freeze on bank 
deposits and the default, and tacitly supported increased government 
intervention and regulation of the economy.151 As a result, the key in 
Argentina for governing the country is based on the control of the 
Supreme Court and Congress, through agreements with the 
provinces. The only way to stay in power is through total power, 
though for all it is fleeting.  
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TABLE III: ECONOMIC POLICY BY SECTOR 
Government Institutional Changes by Sectors 
 Banking and 
Money 
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Institutions are important for economic growth. An adequate 
system of rule of law is one of the most important requirements for 
investment and long term growth. Checks and balances in the 
political system, especially an independent judiciary, help to limit the 
ability of governments to expropriate private investments. In the case 
of Argentina, Peron’s government introduced changes that 
suppressed judicial independence and set in motion a cycle of 
continuous changes in the judicial system. After Peron all but one 
government impeached, forced resignations, or added Supreme Court 
justices.152 As we showed, judicial instability has been closely related 
to political and economic instability, creating an uncertain 
environment for investment. Furthermore, even though the country 
returned to democracy for over twenty years, judicial instability 
remains ingrained in the political system and undermines the 
institutional framework for economic growth.153 
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SUPREME COURT JUDGES’ TENURE 
Year Change President Political Regime




Changes in Justices accounted 
for by death, retirement (old 




Roca (1880–86) (PAN) 
J. Celman (1886–90) (PAN) 
Pellegrini (1890–92) (PAN) 
L.S.Peña (1892–95) 
(Independent) 
Uriburu (1895–98) (PAN) 
Roca (1898–1904) (PAN) 
Quintana (1904–06) (PAN) 
F. Alcorta (1906–10) (PAN) 
R.S.Peña (1910–
14)(Independent) 




1916–30 Changes in Justices accounted 
for by death, retirement (old 
age) or voluntary resignation. 
Yrigoyen (1916–22) (UCR) 
Alvear (1922–28) (UCR) 
Yrygoyen (1928–30) (UCR) 
Democracy 
 
1930–32 Changes in Justices accounted 
for by death, retirement (old 
age) or voluntary resignation. 
Uriburu (1930–32) Military 
Government 
1932–43 Changes in Justices accounted 
for by death, retirement (old 
age) or voluntary resignation. 
Justo (1932–38) (Independent) 






1943–46 Changes in Justices accounted 
for by death, retirement (old 





1946–55 Impeachment of four of the five 
Supreme Court justices.  
Peron (1946–52) (Peronist) 
Peron (1952–55) (Peronist) 
Democracy 
1955–58 The military government forces 
resignation of the entire 





1958–62 The new constitutional 
government forces some 
resignations and added two new 
justices. 
Frondizi (1958–62) (UCRI) Limited 
Democracy 
(Peronist Party 
is banned from 
elections) 
1962–66 Changes in justices accounted 
for by death, retirement (old 
age) or voluntary resignation. 
Guido (1962–63) (UCRI) 
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Year Change President Political Regime
1966–73 Military government forced 
resignations of all justices. It 
reduced the number of justices 







1973–76 The new constitutional 
government replaces all the five 
justices. 
Campora (1973) (Justicialista) 
Lastiri (1973) (Justicialista) 




1976–83 The military government 







1983–89 The new democratic 
government replaces all fives 
justices. 
Alfonsin (1983–89) (UCR) Democracy 
1989–
2001 
In 1990 President Menem added 
four new justices to the 








Congress started impeachment 
to the justices that named 
Menem. 
Duhalde forced resignation of 
one justice. 
Primero Dec 21–Dec 23 2001 
(Justicialista) 
Rodriguez Saa Dec 23–Dec 31 
(Justicialista) 
Segundo Jan 1–Jan 2 2002 
(Justicialista) 
Duhalde Jan 2002–June 2003 
(Justicialista). 
De La Rua 
ousted, 4 






Congress continued with 
impeachment. One justice 
impeached, other three forced to 
resign. 
Kirchner (2003–) (Justicialista)  
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